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Abstract: Emotions encompass cognitive and behavioural responses to reward and 
punishment. Using contests as a case-study, we propose that short-term emotions 
underpin animals’ assessments, decision-making, and behaviour. Equating contest 
assessments to emotional “appraisals”, we describe how contestants appraise more 
than resource value and outcome probability. These appraisals elicit the cognition, 
drive, and neurophysiology that governs aggressive behaviour. We discuss how recent 
contest outcomes induce longer-term moods, which impact subsequent contest 
behaviour. Finally, we distinguish between integral (objectively relevant) and 
incidental (objectively irrelevant) emotions and moods (“affective states”). Unlike 
existing ecological models, our approach predicts that incidental events influence 
contest dynamics, and that contests become incidental influences themselves, 
potentially causing maladaptive decision-making. As affective states cross contexts, a 
more holistic ethology (incorporating emotions and moods) would illuminate animal 
cognition and behaviour. 
Keywords: Affective state, assessment, cognition, resource-holding potential, 
resource value, winner/loser effects. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Consider this: animal behaviour is underpinned by emotions and moods (“affective 
states”; see [1–11]). We define emotions as short-term states elicited by stimuli (or 
their predictors) that animals will work to acquire (rewards; e.g. prey) or avoid 
(punishments; e.g. predators [5,12,13]). Moods are longer-term states, which 
represent the cumulative average of emotions over time [14,15]. These functional 
definitions apply to any organism with a central nervous system [1]. Animal welfare 
scientists, neuroscientists, and psychopharmacologists now recognise that affective 
states play a key role in decision-making [6,7]. However, behavioural ecologists and 
fundamental ethologists have not yet embraced emotions and moods [16]. 
Two main dimensions characterise affective states: valence and arousal [6,17–19] 
(Figure 1). Valence, which ranges from positive to negative, encapsulates the fitness 
benefits and costs associated with a stimulus, either anticipated or actual [7]. 
Meanwhile, arousal (emotional intensity) indicates stimulus importance or urgency. 
High-arousal affective states divert attentional resources to the stimulus [20] and 
predispose vigorous action [21]. As well as emotions and moods, valence and arousal 
define sensations (e.g. pain) and interoception (which internal stimuli elicit; e.g. 
hunger [10]). Burgdorf and Panksepp [22] hypothesised that positive-valence, high-
arousal states represent the activation of a reward acquisition system, whereas 
negative-valence, high-arousal states represent the activation of a punishment 
avoidance system. By conceptualising affective states in terms of reward and 
punishment, this dimensional approach captures their evolutionary function and 
avoids categorical labels that can lead to anthropomorphism (e.g. [8]). 
Figure 1. Valence and arousal define affective states (grey box), which encompasses 
emotions and moods [6]. Moving from Q3-Q1 is increasingly appetitive; Q2-Q4 is 
increasingly aversive. 
Anderson and Adolphs [1] identified two further characteristics of affective states. As 
well as having valence and arousal (“scalability”), emotions “generalise”: various 
stimuli and situations can induce a particular affective state, and affective states can 
be associated with various behavioural responses. Affective states also “persist” after 
stimulus removal. Thus, emotions do not mediate fixed responses to specific stimuli, 
because fixed responses neither generalise nor persist. Examples of non-affective 
behaviours, therefore, include withdrawal reflexes (which are genetically encoded 
from birth) and sexual imprinting (which is learnt during development and 
subsequently invariant). Emotions, on the other hand, facilitate flexible behaviour in 
complex, variable environments [23]. 
We propose that animal contests are an example of affective behaviour. Contests are 
direct inter-individual interactions that determine access to resources, such as food, 
mates or territory (i.e. rewards [24]). Resource value (RV) is the fitness benefit of the 
resource [25]. Contest costs include energy and time expenditure, injury, and even 
death (i.e. punishments [26]). Greater potential benefits justify greater costs, so 
increasing RV increases investment [27,28]. However, contest costs and outcomes are 
not fixed. Resource-holding potential (RHP) is the ability to win contests, comprising 
traits like size, skill, and weaponry [29–31]. Animals with a higher RHP are better at 
winning, so they are more likely to gain resources. Contests involve acquiring 
resources and avoiding punishments (valence), vary in intensity and escalation 
(arousal), are elicited by diverse stimuli and exhibited in various ways 
(generalisation), and continue after the inciting event (persistence). These features 
imply an internal (i.e. affective) state mediating the link between reward, punishment, 
and contest behaviour. 
Previous researchers have not comprehensively applied affective state theory to 
animal contests. However, conceptualised as responses to rewards, punishments, and 
their predictors, emotions cover contest information-gathering, decision-making, and 
behaviour. This novel approach extends and refines contest motivation models. For 
example, Elwood and Arnott [32] explained contest dynamics in terms of two 
dimensions: RV and costs. A contestant engages if RV exceeds costs and withdraws if 
costs exceed RV. Whereas RV usually remains stable, costs accumulate throughout 
the contest. If costs increase enough to exceed RV, a contestant’s strategy switches 
from engage to withdraw. This model approximates the valence dimension of 
affective states – RV representing positive valence and costs representing negative 
valence – except that valence is not specific to contests [6,7,14,15]. 
In this review, we use contests as a case-study for applying emotion theory to 
behavioural ecology and fundamental ethology. We argue that contestants evaluate 
contest benefits and costs, and that these “appraisals” elicit emotional episodes 
encompassing contest decisions and behaviour. We describe how the affective 
outcome of contests might produce experience effects: prior winners’ tendency to 
initiate and win (and prior losers’ tendency to avoid and lose) subsequent contests. 
Unlike traditional ecological models, our perspective predicts that affective states 
previously induced in other behavioural contexts will impact contest dynamics. These 
objectively irrelevant influences could mediate contest decisions and cause 
maladaptive behaviour. 
2. Structure of Emotions 
Emotions are elicited by appraisals: evaluations of stimuli, their context, and their 
personal significance [33]. Scherer [34] proposed that humans sequentially appraise 
stimulus novelty, intrinsic valence, congruence with personal goals, outcome 
probability, discrepancy from expectations, situation controllability, other individuals’ 
responsibility, and whether potential responses are socially acceptable. Appraisal 
outcomes determine and differentiate emotions [35], with continuously-updated re-
appraisals regulating the response [36]. Other mammals, birds, and fish also appear to 
appraise stimuli [23]. In lambs (Ovis aries), for example, stimulus novelty, 
discrepancy from expectations, controllability, and social context impact physiology 
and behaviour [37]. These inferred appraisals elicit flexible emotional responses, 
which account for current conditions and personal circumstances, as well as intrinsic 
stimulus characteristics. 
Emotions have multiple components that can be measured empirically [10,38] (Figure 
2). These include changes in (1) cognition: information-gathering and processing; (2) 
drive: manifested as the work animals will invest to access reward or avoid 
punishment; and (3) neurophysiology: central and peripheral nervous system activity, 
and neuroendocrine function. Such changes facilitate the performance of (4) 
behaviour, producing an organism-level response to reward and punishment [5,39,40]. 
Threatening stimuli, for instance, impact (1) cognition: increasing attention to the 
threat; (2) drive: maximising the work animals will invest in performing freeze, fight, 
or flight responses; and (3) neurophysiology: activating both the sympathetic nervous 
system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. These changes prepare the individual 
for (4) behaviour: avoiding, attacking or escaping the threat. 
Figure 2. An emotional episode (white box). Appraisals of stimuli, their context, and 
their personal significance elicit the emotion (grey box), whose components include 
cognition, drive, and neurophysiology. These components govern the expression of 
behaviour. Conscious “feelings” (not shown) are another potential component, but 
not essential. 
Conscious feelings, another potential emotion component, cannot be directly 
measured. Humans describe feelings through language, which animals cannot do. As 
a result, animal researchers usually study other emotion components and remain 
agnostic about feelings [4,9,10]. Indeed, many human psychologists recognise 
unconscious emotion, where the measurable components occur without corresponding 
feelings [41]. For example, Winkielman et al. [42] showed people positive or negative 
facial expressions. The images appeared too briefly for conscious awareness. When 
subsequently offered a novel drink, subjects shown the positive expression poured 
more, drank more, and paid more than subjects shown the negative expression. Self-
reported affective states did not differ between treatments. In animals, the relationship 
between feeling and non-feeling emotion components is an important area for future 
research [43]. However, for present purposes, we view emotions as functional states 
that may or may not be accompanied by feelings. 
 
Animal welfare scientists and psychopharmacologists investigate affective states 
through both experiment and observation. In emotion induction experiments, rewards 
(e.g. enrichment [44]) induce positive emotions, and punishments (e.g. social defeat 
[45]) induce negative emotions [13]. Pharmacological manipulations may also induce 
positive- and negative-valence states [46]. Observationally, the measurable 
components of an emotional episode can indicate valence [4]. This includes changes 
in (1) cognition: attention [47], judgement [48,49], and memory biases [50]; (2) drive: 
the work animals will invest to access reward or avoid punishment [51,52]; (3) 
neurophysiology: brain and neuroendocrine circuits [5,8], and peripheral nervous 
system activity [2]; and (4) behaviour: approach, exploration, and play are often 
positively valenced, whereas avoidance and hiding are often negatively valenced [2]. 
Detailed discussion of empirical methods is beyond our scope, but we direct readers 
to previous reviews on measuring affective states in animals [2,4,6–8,10,11,47–
49,51,52]. 
3. Initiating, Escalating, and Quitting Contests 
Contest theorists emphasise two key assessments: animals assess RV (which 
determines fitness benefits and motivation) and RHP (which predicts fitness costs and 
outcome likelihood [25,29]). Contestants may assess only their own RHP (self-
assessment [53,54]) or compare their RHP to their opponent’s (mutual assessment 
[26,28,55]). In a meta-analysis of 36 species’ assessment strategies, Pinto et al. [56] 
found that self-assessment is more common than mutual assessment. 
Appraisal theory articulates and extends contest theory. The former predicts broader 
evaluations of the resource, opponent, and context, all related back to the individual’s 
own goals. Under Scherer’s [34] sequential theory, contestants would first appraise 
novelty. Familiar resources are valued above novel resources (e.g. residency effects 
[57,58]), whilst dominance hierarchies reduce aggression towards familiar rivals [59]. 
Second, contestants would appraise the resource’s intrinsic valence (objective RV; 
e.g. the calories in food). Third, contestants would appraise whether the resource 
contributes to their goals (subjective RV; e.g. starving animals value food most [60]). 
Fourth, contestants would appraise outcome probability (which covers RHP 
assessments). Animals avoid or de-escalate contests they will probably lose [29]. 
Fifth, contestants would appraise discrepancy from expectations. Compared to 
unconditioned controls, animals trained that a stimulus signals reward become more 
aggressive when the stimulus is unrewarded [61–63]. Sixth, contestants would 
appraise their response’s compatibility with social context. Observer presence can 
modify animals’ behaviour (audience effects [64–66]) and watching contests can 
modify the observers’ subsequent behaviour (bystander effects [64,67]). During 
ongoing contests, animals also reappraise assessments, adjusting their behaviour as 
information and costs accumulate [31,55]. These appraisals have all been empirically 
documented, but several are not incorporated into current contest theory. 
 
We further postulate that appraisals unify reward and punishment inputs into a 
decision-making common currency [68,69]. This facilitates cross-context 
comparisons between competing emotions, moods, sensations, and interoception. For 
instance, food-deprived goldfish (Carassius auratus) endure more electric shocks to 
feed than well-fed goldfish [60]. Following shocks, fewer hermit crabs (Pagurus 
bernhardus) evacuate preferred Littorina shells than non-preferred Gibbula shells 
[70]. We conceptualise valence as the common currency in these reward/punishment 
trade-offs. Contestants likewise weigh RV against potential contest costs and outcome 
likelihood [32]. In self-assessment, contestants’ affective states integrate RV and own 
RHP information. Animals persist until they reach a negative-valence threshold: the 
maximum cost they will pay for the resource. This threshold may be energetic [71,72] 
or include injury costs as well [73]. In mutual assessment, affective states integrate 
RV, own RHP, and opponent RHP information. Animals withdraw when they 
establish that their opponent has a higher RHP [55], perhaps when they tip below 
neutral valence. Both self- and mutual assessment models require unidimensional 
(valence) comparisons of fitness-relevant information. 
 
Affective states may also determine assessment strategy. Researchers traditionally 
viewed assessment strategies as fixed (e.g. [29,32,74]), but now recognise individual- 
and population-level variation [75–77]. For example, green anoles (Anolis 
carolinensis) [78], mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias marmoratus) [79], and fiddler 
crabs (Uca mjoebergi) [80] use mutual assessment when deciding whether to escalate 
a contest, and self-assessment during the fight. Humans in positive affective states 
rely on heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) more than humans in negative affective states 
[81]. When assessing the strength of an argument, for instance, people experiencing 
positive emotions use the author’s expertise, whereas people in neutral states judge 
the content (i.e. deeper processing [82,83]). In animal contests, positive valence may 
also promote less cognitively demanding assessment strategies, such as self-
assessment or rules of thumb (e.g. “resident wins”; see [84]). Future research could 
manipulate affective states to test this. We hypothesise that prior reward will lead to 
self-assessment, whereas prior punishment will lead to mutual assessment. 
Having defined emotions as functional responses to reward and punishment, we can 
say that contest assessments (i.e. appraisals) elicit emotions. We propose that positive 
emotions about potential contests indicate that fitness benefits outweigh perceived 
costs, activating a reward acquisition system [6,7]. This system covers (1) cognition: 
information gathering and decisions to enter and escalate contests; (2) drive: work 
invested to attack; (3) neurophysiology: dopamine and opioid activity; and (4) 
behaviour: threat displays and aggression. By contrast, negative emotions indicate that 
perceived contest costs outweigh fitness benefits, activating a punishment avoidance 
system. This system covers (1) cognition: information gathering and decisions to 
avoid and withdraw; (2) drive: work invested to escape; (3) neurophysiology: reduced 
serotonergic activity; and (4) behaviour: submission and retreat. 
From a human perspective, linking positive valence and aggressive behaviour may 
seem counterintuitive. Anger, for instance, feels negative [85], but causes aggression 
[86,87]. However, this perspective is based on our conscious experience of emotion 
(i.e. the feeling component). The non-feeling components indicate that anger is a 
reward acquisition emotion (i.e. positive valence), not a punishment avoidance 
emotion (i.e. negative valence [88]). Anger drives approach towards the inducing 
stimulus, whereas negative-valence emotions drive withdrawal [88]. As a result, our 
functional definition of emotion – which does not require conscious feeling – 
categorises anger as positively valenced. Negative-valence emotions can lead to 
aggressive behaviour, but only when withdrawal is not an option (e.g. cornered 
animals lashing out). In the present manuscript, we only consider positive-valence 
aggression, where the aim is resource acquisition. 
This review focuses on contest initiation, winning, and losing, but affective states 
might also govern behavioural transitions within contests, such as levels of display or 
escalated aggression (e.g. [78–80]). From an emotion standpoint, the transitions that 
bookend  contests are more empirically tractable. Applying an emotional event pre-
contest indicates how emotions influence initiation, for example, whereas applying an 
emotional event between contests indicates how emotions disrupt experience effects. 
Tracking emotions during contests is more challenging, as contests are ongoing 
emotional events. To resolve this issue, we propose startling contestants at set points 
during a contest [29,89]. Motivation theorists interpret faster contest resumption (i.e. 
shorter startle latencies) as stronger motivation to fight [33]. However, affective state 
influences the startle reflex [47]. In humans [90], rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 
[91], and rats (Rattus norvegicus) [90], negative-valence states increase startle 
duration and magnitude. Future researchers could use startle duration to understand 
how valence relates to within-contest behavioural transitions. 
To summarise, emotion theory correctly predicts that contest assessments cover more 
than RV and RHP. Animals assess the resource, opponent, and context, in relation to 
individual circumstances. We hope researchers investigate whether additional human 
appraisals influence contest dynamics in other species. For example, perhaps agency 
appraisals (who was responsible? what did they intend?) influence contest decision-
making. Under our definition of emotion, these appraisals elicit emotional responses 
that reflect personal circumstances and prevailing conditions. Conceptualising 
cognition, drive, and neurophysiology as a unified affective state underpinning 
behaviour explains existing results and generates new hypotheses. 
4. Contest Outcome and Experience Effects 
Contest outcomes indicate how an individual’s RHP compares to the population’s 
RHP [92,93]. Assuming self-assessment, wins signal relatively high personal RHP 
and losses signal relatively low personal RHP. Winners, therefore, initiate, escalate, 
and win more subsequent contests (winner effects), whereas losers avoid and lose 
more subsequent contests (loser effects [94–96]). We conceptualise contests as 
emotional events, so winning induces positive-valence emotions that increase 
aggressive behaviour and losing induces negative-valence emotions that reduce 
aggressive behaviour (even if actual RHP does not change). By reflecting cumulative 
emotional outcomes, winner and loser effects represent longer-term moods (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Cumulative emotional valence determines mood [11] (manifested in 
aggression). Considering only integral (objectively contest-relevant) influences, white 
dots are wins and black dots are losses. Considering both integral and incidental 
(objectively contest-irrelevant) influences, white dots are rewards and black dots are 
punishments. 
Both emotions and moods cause cognitive changes, such as judgement and decision-
making biases [97]. People in positive affective states interpret ambiguous stimuli 
more optimistically than people in negative affective states [81], whereas pessimistic 
judgements characterise depression and anxiety [81,98–100]. Animals also exhibit 
judgement biases. Under ambiguity, mammals, birds, fish, and insects in positive 
affective states have higher expectations of reward and lower expectations of 
punishment than animals in negative affective states [7,46,48,49,101]. Assuming 
reward and punishment experience predicts likely outcomes in the present, moods 
indicate whether ambiguous stimuli signal positive or negative outcomes, leading to 
judgement biases [14,49]. We, therefore, suggest that mood-induced judgement bias 
underlies contest experience effects. Winners gain fitness-enhancing resources, so 
winning is positively valenced. Thus, previous winners should be relatively optimistic 
about unknown rewards (RV) and outcome likelihood (RHP), and correspondingly 
more aggressive. Losing, meanwhile, is negatively valenced, so losers should be more 
pessimistic and less aggressive. Indeed, perceived RHP, rather than actual RHP, 
influences winner and loser effects [94,95] (cf. [102]). 
Empirical evidence suggests that contests induce judgement biases. Researchers have 
trained both dominant and subordinate animals to associate one stimulus with a high-
value reward (leading to shorter response latencies) and another stimulus with a low-
value reward or no reward (leading to longer response latencies). When subsequently 
presented with untrained intermediate stimuli, dominant animals respond faster and 
more frequently than subordinates (rats: [103]; pigs, Sus scrofa: [104]; tufted 
capuchins, Sapajus apella: [105]). We interpret the dominant animals’ higher reward 
anticipation as optimism, which may reflect wins inducing positive valence. In similar 
tasks, rats [45] and Murray cod (Maccullochella peelii) [106] that repeatedly lose 
contests exhibit lower reward anticipation towards ambiguous stimuli, which we 
interpret as pessimism. Equivalent opponent-directed behaviour – reduced likelihood 
of attacking an ambiguous rival – would constitute a loser effect. As judgement biases 
influence responses to ambiguity more than responses to predictable outcomes [7,49], 
we hypothesise that judgement biases impact behaviour in contests with unpredictable 
outcomes (where opponents have similar RHP) more than contests with predictable 
outcomes (where opponents’ RHP differs markedly). 
Experience effects also suggest that contests can be intrinsically rewarding [107]. In 
addition to yielding external reward, aggressive behaviour itself (and particularly 
winning) seems to induce positive affective states, which may inform future 
decisions. For example, mice (Mus musculus) learn instrumental responses to access 
and attack submissive opponents [108]. Responses decline for non-submissive 
opponents, revealing that outcome matters. Moreover, winning induces conditioned 
place preference in mice [109], Syrian hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) [110], and 
green anoles [111]. From an affective state perspective, positive emotions reward this 
conditioning. Affective reinforcement might also occur within a single contest. For 
instance, accurate strikes [30] or appropriate assessments [112] may be rewarding. 
To recap, we suggest that moods, which reflect contest outcome experience, mediate 
expectations about unknown RV and future outcomes. Mood-induced judgement bias 
and affective reinforcement may underpin these experience effects. To investigate 
judgement bias, contest researchers could measure optimism pre- and post-contest 
(see [48,49]). We predict that wins induce optimism and losses induce pessimism, 
with state optimism producing winner effects and state pessimism producing loser 
effects. Exploring the role of neurotransmitters linked to reward, such as opioids, 
could reveal whether contests are intrinsically rewarding. 
5. Crossing Behavioural Contexts 
So far, we have considered adaptive affective states. There are clear fitness benefits to 
cumulative experience informing reliable assessments, but existing optimality models 
already predict these effects. How do emotions and moods advance our 
understanding? 
Integral affective states are objectively relevant to a cognitive process. In humans, for 
example, sunshine (stimulus) induces positive valence (emotion) that causes a 
decision (cognition) to go outside (behaviour). Incidental affective states, on the other 
hand, influence objectively unrelated cognitive processes [38,81,113–115]. For 
example, people rate their overall life satisfaction higher on sunny days than rainy 
days [116]. Sunshine (stimulus) induces positive valence (emotion) that causes an 
objectively unrelated assessment (cognition) to be reported positively (behaviour). 
Incidental affective states, thus, distinguish optimal and affective decision-making. 
Optimality models only use integral information, whereas affective states incorporate 
incidental influences as well. 
Although understudied in behavioural ecology, incidental affective states influence 
animal cognition and behaviour. Starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) with enriched housing 
judge unrelated temporal stimuli more optimistically [44], whilst honeybees (Apis 
mellifera) shaken aversively judge unrelated olfactory stimuli more pessimistically 
[117]. Moreover, isolating rats improves recall of unrelated light and sound stimuli 
[50]. It follows that incidental information may influence contest behaviour, and that 
rewards and punishments in general – not wins and losses specifically – induce 
“winner” and “loser” effects (Figure 3). For instance, positive-valence female 
interactions increase aggressive behaviour in male speckled wood butterflies (Pararge 
aegeria) [118] and wolf spiders (Venonia coruscans) [119], whereas negative-valence 
predator exposure decreases aggressive behaviour in daffodil cichlids 
(Neolamprologus pulcher) [120]. However, a note of caution: apparently incidental 
influences may be functionally integral. Presence of a potential mate, for example, 
increases contest benefits, and predation risk increases contest costs [118–120]. We 
must understand a species’ ecology to determine whether cross-context variables are 
objectively relevant, and hence whether they are integral or incidental. We hope that 
new studies fill this knowledge-gap. Contest researchers could borrow affective state 
research methods from animal welfare science and psychopharmacology. Exposing 
fish to antidepressants and anxiolytics in wastewater has produced equivocal results: 
venlafaxine increases aggression [121], but fluoxetine reduces aggression [122]. To 
test whether incidental affective states influence contest behaviour, we need 
controlled interventions in more species. 
Incidental affective states not only influence contests; contests might also induce 
incidental affective states and influence objectively unrelated cognitive processes (see 
[123]). For example, rats that repeatedly lose contests develop anhedonia: reduced 
reward sensitivity, expressed in non-contest situations and linked to depression in 
humans. Giving the rats unrelated but signalled food rewards reverses this effect 
[124]. Compared to tufted capuchins with subordinate bystanders, capuchins exposed 
to aggressive bystanders allocate more attention towards humans [125]. Dominant 
capuchins [105] and pigs [104] expect more positive outcomes from ambiguous 
spatial stimuli (i.e. optimism), whilst subordinate cod expect fewer positive outcomes 
from ambiguous spatial stimuli [106] (i.e. pessimism). Contest-induced incidental 
affective states may influence virtually any decision. Is brightly-coloured prey toxic 
or a mimic? Are rustling leaves a predator or the wind? When moods bias decisions, 
the most encountered emotional stimuli with the longest duration and most polar 
valence might determine behaviour, regardless of objective relevance. It is possible 
that frequently winning contests, for example, may induce optimism that rare prey is 
edible, even if the prey is usually toxic. This example illustrates how decision-making 
using incidental information can negatively impact fitness. Incidental affective states 
may cause maladaptive behaviour [38]. 
Given their maladaptive potential, we suggest two reasons for incidental affective 
states. First, to be selected, cross-context affective states must increase fitness on 
average – not necessarily every time. Nettle and Bateson [14] noted that recent 
environment and physical condition persist across behavioural contexts. Lame 
animals, for instance, cannot fight, forage or flee from predators, so information from 
each of these contexts is integral to the others. Cross-context affective states will be 
selected if most are integral, even if some are incidental. In humans, various measures 
increase the likelihood that cross-context affective states only influence relevant 
cognition [114,115]. For example, people associate their affective states with 
concurrent cognitive processes [126]. Incidental emotional influences are also less 
common than incidental moods, because emotions usually have an obvious cause 
[114]. Animal research may reveal similar mechanisms to limit incidental affect. 
The second possible explanation is that incidental affective states dominate when 
animals lack reliable information, or when acquisition and storage costs outweigh the 
benefits [59]. This is why humans evaluating ambiguous stimuli (e.g. brand names 
without product details) rely on incidental affective states [127]. In animal contests, a 
fight indicates rival RHP most accurately, but entails substantial investment and 
potential injury [64,67]. Assessments in other contexts carry their own cost/accuracy 
trade-offs. Bystander effects avoid fight costs and reflect individual RHP, but they 
require individual discrimination and recall [32]. Winner and loser effects are less 
cognitively demanding, but based on previous opponents’ RHP. This measure will 
predict future opponents’ RHP less accurately than individual assessments. We 
hypothesise that mood does not even distinguish between behavioural contexts, 
further reducing both cognitive requirements and accuracy. Incidental affective states 
may, therefore, influence decisions when contestants have less reliable information or 
high information-gathering costs (e.g. intruders). From this perspective, incidental 
affective states are the “best of a bad job”. 
In summary, integral affective states are objectively relevant and adaptive, whereas 
incidental affective states are objectively irrelevant and potentially maladaptive. 
Incidental influences may nonetheless seep in when integral information is 
unavailable or costly. Despite preliminary evidence, we do not yet know the extent of 
incidental affective states in animal decision-making. We hope that future researchers 
test whether objectively unrelated stimuli impact contest dynamics. Without integral 
influences, we predict that generic rewards increase aggression and generic 
punishments decrease aggression. 
6. Conclusion 
An affective states approach generates novel predictions and opens new avenues for 
behavioural ecology (Table 1). Both emotions and contest behaviour rely on 
assessments of stimuli and their personal significance; both enlist cognition, drive, 
and neurophysiology; and both reflect reward and punishment experience. We equate 
contest assessments to emotional appraisals, which determine contest decision-
making and behaviour. We explain experience effects as wins inducing positive 
moods and losses inducing negative moods. This hypothesis, and our conception of 
contests as emotional episodes, predicts that manipulating affective state will modify 
contest behaviour. As well as integral influences, incidental affective states may 
impact contests, and contest-induced affective states may impact objectively unrelated 
behaviours. We hypothesise that high-frequency, long-lasting, polar-valence events 
disproportionately influence animal decision-making and behaviour, even if 
incidental. Moreover, despite our focus on contests, emotion theory may underpin all 
non-reflexive behaviour – from signalling to mate choice to parental care. 
Behavioural ecologists and fundamental ethologists study these fields individually, 
but affective states transcend our boundaries. We need a more holistic ethology to 
understand affective cognition and behaviour. 
Table 1. Major predictions and outstanding questions from applying emotion theory 
to animal contests 
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